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Abstract
This study employs four dimensional (firm-product-destination-year) export data of
Brazilian firms to empirically examine the effect of past exporting relationships of
firms, whose products are targeted by antidumping duties, on their export flows to
alternative markets. We show that, on the intensive margin, firms increase their
export volumes to alternative countries in which they were already exporting the
duty imposed product when they suffer an AD duty in a particular country. On the
extensive margin, our findings suggest that firms’ probability of exporting a duty
imposed product to a new market resulting from an AD duty in a different market
increases only if they have already an established trading relationship in that market.
In addition to making sense of existing puzzles in trade deflection, this paper makes an
important contribution by demonstrating how much the fixed costs of developing
an export destination matter in terms of trade deflection.
JEL Classification: F10, F13, O54, C23
Keywords: Antidumping, trade deflection, WTO, intensive margin, extensive margin, firm-level
export data
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1. INTRODUCTION
Antidumping (AD) has become a favorite remedy for the firms which seek
protection. These preferences have increased especially after the substantial tariff
liberalization countries have undergone after the World Trade Organization
(WTO)’s rules and enforcements. Most tariffs are governed by trade agreements;
however countries can impose temporary import restrictions by the use of
alternative instruments. Among these instruments, AD has become the most
frequently used and the most effective one.3
Similar to other discriminatory adjustments in trade policy, AD duties not
only affect the trade flows of the named and the duty imposing country but also
affect the trade flows of the third party countries.4 This effect can occur in the form
of trade diversion, a change in the source of origin for a country's imports caused
by a change in importer’s trade policy, or in the form of trade deflection, a change
in the destination of exports due to an increase in trade restriction in a particular
export market. One of the more well-known pieces of evidence on trade diversion
is from Prusa (2001) who shows that US imposition of an AD duty increases the
imports from the countries which are not named in the investigation.
The idea of trade deflection was first introduced by Bown and Crowley
(henceforth BC) (2007). In their product-level analysis, they show that US
imposition of import restrictions in the form of an AD duty resulted in Japanese
exports surging to non-US countries. Their findings suggest that exporters which
suffer discriminatory trade restrictions in a country strive to find alternative
markets to sell their products. In contrast to their analysis based on Japan, BC
Antidumping duties, which are defined in GATT Article VI, are easier to use compared to other
safeguards such as emergency protection of a threatened industry (GATT Article XIX), exceptions
for health or safety concerns (GATT Article XX) and restrictions for national security (GATT Article
XXI).
4 A ‘discriminatory’ trade policy is the one in which a country imposes different trade restrictions
to imports from different exporting countries. Two examples in this category are the preferential
trade agreements and antidumping duties. On the contrary, a ‘nondiscriminatory’ trade policy is
the one that is applied equally to all importers.
3
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(2010) suggest no systematic evidence of trade deflection for Chinese products
targeted by US AD duties. They also mention that the lack of trade deflection
could be related to the fact that China is a “new” entrant to the global trading
system and Chinese firms have not yet set up necessary networks to deflect trade
to alternate markets.5
However plausible their argument on the lack of trade deflection in China
is, the product-level feature of their dataset does not allow them to explore the
linkage between firms’ previous exporting status in different markets and trade
deflection. It is highly likely that Japanese firms which were serving more markets
compared to their Chinese counterparts could deflect their trade to alternative
destinations. In addition, some Chinese firms might have deflected their
shipments to some of their trading partners, which would be hidden when the
exports are aggregated to product level. In the presence of sunk start-up costs of
exporting, it is difficult for the exporters to sell their products in alternative
markets if they have not setup ongoing trading relationships in multiple markets.
This argument is impossible to analyze without breaking down the firm exports
by exported products and export destinations.
This study employs a unique four dimensional (firm-product-destinationyear) Brazilian firm-level export data to investigate the effect of sunk start-up costs
of exporting on the trade flows of the firms to alternative markets when they
suffer AD duties in a particular destination. Analyzing the firm-level responses of
AD duties on trade deflection will provide a better understanding of which
destinations are potential export markets and whether the past trading
relationships matter to deflect trade for the firms whose products are targeted by
AD measures. In this regard, our rich dataset provides a unique opportunity to
explore the variation in exports within firms across different destinations when

China was granted membership in the WTO in 2001 and BC (2010) investigates the pre-accession
period of China to WTO.
5
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there is a change in trade barrier for a particular product in a particular export
destination.
To date, there is too few studies in the AD literature using firm-level data.
Konings and Vandenbussche (henceforth KV) (2008) estimate the effect of
antidumping protection on the productivity of domestic import-competing firms
in the EU. Belderbos (1997) illustrates the relationship between EU and US
antidumping measures and foreign direct investment through a microeconometrical analysis of Japanese firms’ plant establishments in the electronics
industry. In a noticeably detailed analysis, Pierce (2011) investigates the plantlevel responses to AD measures for the protected plants in the US. Avsar (2012)
examines the pricing effect of AD duties and the exporters’ response to a threat of
retaliation stemming from domestic AD actions. KV (2010) remains the only firmlevel study of AD policy to analyze the value of export sales and the extensive
margin of exports.
Although related, our paper conceptually distinguishes from KV (2010) by
the fact that their study focuses on the effect of France’s AD duties on the exports
of the domestic protected firms, whereas this paper analyzes the effect of AD
duties which targets the exporters in the international market. In addition, they
exploit a three dimensional panel which does not differentiate the product
categories for the firms which exports multiple products. Whereas, with a four
dimensional panel data for firm, product and destinations, the empirical analysis
carried out in this paper is a significant improvement over the previous studies
which investigate the trading effects of AD measures.
It should be highlighted that AD duties provide a useful way of examining
trade deflection. Antidumping duties yield substantial changes in trade flows
given the fact that they are on average 10 to 20 times higher than the most favored
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nation (MFN) tariffs.6 Besides, AD duty is a product and a market specific trading
cost for a firm. For example, if Mexican AD agencies impose an AD duty on
Brazilian cotton shirt exporters, neither the other textile shirt exporters of Brazil
nor the cotton shirt exporters of Argentina will be affected by this discriminatory
policy adjustment. Hence, if a firm sells multiple products to a destination, it is
obliged to pay AD duties only for the particular product which is targeted by the
importer country. Since our analysis is based on the attractive source of variation
in the value of exports within firm-product combinations across export
destinations, these product specific shocks for the firms in different export markets
perfectly fits with our research question.
Alongside this, Brazil is a well-suited country for such an analysis for
number of reasons. First, highly disaggregated firm-level data of Brazilian exports
makes Brazil an outstanding case for this research. Second, Brazilian exported
products were frequently targeted by AD duty over the period of our sample.
There are 51 AD cases filed against Brazil in this period, 40 of which resulted ‘n
rulings against Brazil. Moreover, these affirmative cases correspond to 120 unique
six-digit HS products. Finally, countries which imposed AD duty on Brazilian
exported products accounts for almost 50% of the Brazil’s total exports over the
sample. This allows us to expect a dramatic impact of AD duties imposed by these
countries on the trade flows of Brazilian firms to third countries. Table 1
documents the products subject to AD duties and the duty imposing countries
between 1994 and 2000.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: firms only deflect exports
to countries where they have an already established trading relationship.

In

particular, we find that, on the intensive margin, firms increase their export to
alternative countries in which they were already exporting the targeted product
when they suffer an AD duty in a particular export destination. On the extensive
6
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margin, our findings suggest that firms’ probability of exporting the duty imposed
product to a different market increases only if they have already an established
trading relationship in that market. In contrast, we find no significant effect of AD
duties on the firms’ probability of exporting the particular product in different
export destinations that the firm did not serve before.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
describes the data; section 3 discusses the motivation of our empirical strategy and
the formal econometric methodology. In section 4, we document the results.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
2. DATA
Export data comes from the Brazilian customs office SECEX (Secretaria de
Comércio Exterior ) which documents exports by product code at the plant, month
and NCM (Nomenclatura Comum do Mercosul ) level. The NCM codes are 8-digit
numbers, of which the first six digits coincide with the first six digits in the
Harmonized System. The destination information is mapped from Brazilian
country codes into the international ISO system. The product codes at the 6-digit
level in the Brazilian data, for which there exists no corresponding Harmonized
System entries, are removed from the data. All export values in the SECEX data
are reported in current U.S. dollars (USD), free on board (fob). We utilize
observations for the years between 1994 and 2000.7 We aggregate monthly plantlevel export information to years and firms. Export sales are deflated to their
August-1994 equivalents using the monthly U.S. consumer price index (from
Global Financial Data).
The employment and wage data of Brazilian firms are obtained from the
collection of annual reports with individual information on workers and
employees, which is called RAIS (Relacao Anual de Informacoes Sociais). Similar to

7
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our treatment of the export data, we aggregate the monthly worker-plant
information to years and firms.8
Finally, the data on AD is obtained from Global Antidumping Database.9 This
database provides detailed product level information on the AD petitions such as
the initiation date, the decision date, the targeted country, and the final decision of
the AD authority as well as the HS codes of the products subject to filings.
3. THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
The Classification of firm-product combinations
Participating in export markets requires sunk start-up costs in the form of
establishing necessary networks, acquiring information about the official
procedures and adapting products. This makes the current-period export supply
dependent upon the previous exporting status, given the fact that firms are able to
continue exporting without burdening the start-up costs if they already exported
to a particular market before. 10 Das et al. (2001), for instance, provide an
estimation of such costs using structural estimates for Colombian firms and
suggest that these costs are quite substantial; on average as high as 400,000 dollars.
Most models of international trade on firm heterogeneity assume that these entry
costs to export market are constant and exogenous to the firm.11 More recently,
utilizing Chilean firm-level data Alvarez et al. (2010) uncovers sizeable
heterogeneity across destinations in the nature of entry into different markets for
firm-product combinations. Their study points out that these costs are indeed,
market and product-market specific.
We also build our empirical strategy on these start-up costs of exporting.
Before proceeding, we demonstrate the basis of our classification in Figure 1.
Suppose that country i impose an AD duty on Brazilian exporters of product X.

See Hirakawa, Muendler and Rauch (2010) for more information about SECEX and RAIS data.
http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/gad/
10 See Dixit (1989) and, Baldwin and Krugman (1989), Bernard and Jensen (2001).
11 For example, Clerides et al. (1998) and Melitz (2003).
8
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There are three types of firms at the time of duty imposition which are affected by
this AD measure:


Type 1 firms, which were exporting product X to country i and
non-exporter in country h.



Type 2 firms, which were exporting product X to country i but
exporting another product to country h.



Type 3 firms, which were exporting product X both to i and h.

In order to deflect its trade to country h, type 1 firm, which did not export to
country h before, has to incur the market specific start-up costs such as learning
the bureaucratic procedures of exporting to country h and product-market specific
start-up costs such as adapting the particular product in country h. However, type
2 firm does not have to incur the market specific start-up cost in a similar scenario,
given the fact that it has already served country h before. When it comes to the
type 3 firm, which has an ongoing trading relationship for good X in both
countries, there is no need to pay any start-up cost. Intuitively, deflecting trade to
its trading partner for the type 3 firm is as easy as a couple of more phone calls
compared to the type 1 firm which has to undertake the cost of entering to a new
country, contacting potential customers and establishing necessary distribution
channels to sell its product. On the other hand, type 2 firm has a comparative
advantage over type 1 firm in terms of market specific start-up costs such as
learning the bureaucratic procedures to export to country h.
In the light of this three country setting, we first determined the firms
which were the target of an AD duty at least once in the sample. Second, we
constructed a panel for the firm-product-country triplets where the countries are
the top 40 export destinations of Brazil. Third, we created a dummy variable
which takes on a value of 1 if there is an AD duty in force targeting the particular
firm-product combination in a country other than the country of the unit
7

observation.
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Finally, in order to identify the effect of previous trading

relationships of the firms, we used three different dummies for the three types of
past export status described above.13 More specifically, each AD duty imposed in
an export market creates the three country case mentioned above for Brazil, the
duty imposer country and the destination country of the unit observation.
To better understand the construction of the data, a representative case is
illustrated in Table 2. In 1996, Mexico imposed AD duty to Brazilian steel
connectors’ exporters (HS6 Code: 730719). At the time of the duty imposition, a
firm was exporting steel connectors to Mexico, Chile and USA and ferro-silicomanganese to Canada and Chile. The AD dummy is unity for steel connectors in
non-Mexican destinations to identify the effect of the imposed AD duty by
Mexico. As shown, this firm was non-exporter in Argentina, exporter of steel
connectors in Chile and exporter of another product in the USA in the previous 3
years. Each firm-product-destination is unity only for one of the past export status
dummy which captures the effect of belonging one of these categories on
exporting. The interaction of the AD variable and the past export status, on the
other hand, captures the effect of the Mexican AD duty for these different
categories.
Baseline Estimation
We start our empirical exercise by estimating the following equation:
(

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

(1)

where f denotes a firm, p denotes a six-digit HS product, i denotes an export
destination, t denotes time in years between 1994 and 2000. The variable
(

)denotes the value of exports

) is a binary indicator, equal to 1 if the

particular firm-product combination is hit with an AD duty in an export
12Following

BC (2007), this variable is not zero in the period in which the investigation for an
affirmative AD case is begun because of the fact that the targeted exporters begin to respond to
tentative duty imposition shortly after the date filing is announced.
13 We used three-year definition to denote past exporting status positive.
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destination except country i
magnitude of

14 .

(

) is a vector of firm characteristics. The

can be interpreted as trade deflection resulting from the AD duty

in country h.
We assume that

comprises two components, a permanent firm-

product-country component and a transitory component. So the error term
satisfies:
(2)
where

and

are independent of each other. Fixed

effects (FE) estimator is one way of estimating equation (1) because it eliminates
time invariant error component,

However, the greatest econometric concern

in FE estimation of equation (1) is that it results in biased and inconsistent
estimates associated with the serial correlation of

(

) with FE transformed

residuals. In order to remedy this autocorrelation, we first difference equation (1)
and estimate it using the two stage least squares/instrumental variables (IV)
approach described in Anderson and Hsiao (1982) in which we instrument for
using the multiple lags of the levels of this variable.15,16
It should be emphasized that there are also two potential problems with the
IV estimator used in estimating equation (2); bias due to the measurement error
and bias associated with the use of a weak instrument. If there is measurement
error in

(

), then the measurement error in the variable,

correlated with the measurement error in the instrument,
we employ an alternative instrument,

(

(
(

), will be
) Therefore,

) in consideration that its

measurement error is not correlated with the measurement error in

(

).17

This variable is non-zero for the consecutive years in which the duty is in effect.
Note that direct estimation of the first difference of equation (1) by OLS also provides biased
estimates because lagged difference of exports is correlated with the error term.
16 Inclusion of the lagged dependent variable is important to control for the consideration that
firms may ramp up exporting everywhere regardless of the AD action.
17See BC (2007) for the same argument.
14
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In addition, to test the quality of the instrument, we estimate the first-stage model
using our instrument. We find that our instruments are strong and conclude that
IV approach is appropriate for our estimation.18
Control Variables
Exporters are found to be more productive than non-exporters.19 In line
with this, a change in exporter firm’s productivity over time might affect the total
value of its shipments. Therefore, our policy interactions might capture the effect
of a productivity shock at the firm level that would be correlated with the growth
in exports. The customs data does not allow us to control for productivity because
it contains no information on domestic sales. However, we control for the size of
the firms which is measured by the total number of workers employed within a
year. It is believed that larger firms tend to be more productive and have higher
expected profits from exporting. Moreover, as discussed in Bernard and Jensen
(2004), size may control for several factors; larger firms have lower average and
marginal costs which improve exporting activity and also size is a proxy for past
success by definition.
The growth in exports can also partially be explained by macroeconomic
factors in the destination market. For instance, trade openness, GDP growth and
exchange rate appreciation in a potential export market can work as an import
demand shifter which would help exporters deflect their shipments to that
destination. In this regard, we use country-year dummies to control for
macroeconomic aggregates.
Introducing the role of previous exporting relationships
The first column in Table 2 documents the estimates for equation (1).
Although the policy variable,(

), has the expected sign, it is not statistically

While we do not report the results of the instrument tests, the first stage estimations are available
from the author upon request.
19 See Greenway and Kneller (2007) for a survey of this literature.
18
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significant. In order to examine whether the previous trading relationships of the
firms for the targeted products provides a different outcome in terms of trade
deflection, we continue with estimating the following equations:

(

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

(

)
(3)

(
(

)
where

(

)

(

)

(

)+

)
(4)

is a dummy and unity if the firm in the unit observation was

exporting the targeted product to both country i and h before the duty imposition.
The equation (4) models the probability of exporting in an export market
when an AD duty imposed in a different market (extensive margin).

is a

binary variable that equals 1 if the firm exports product p to country i in time t and
zero otherwise.
and

takes on a value of 1 if the firm was non-exporter in country i

is equal to 1 if the firm did not export product p but exported another

product to country i before the duty imposition.
The most important issue in estimation (4) is the influence of unobserved
heterogeneity. There might be some permanent firm or product attributes; or
managerial skills which are correlated with the decision to start exporting a
particular product as a result of an AD duty imposed in another destination. This
will yield us to overestimate the effect of our policy interactions as these variations
are not observed. There are different alternatives to estimate the binary choice
model of starting to export a product with unobserved elements including
maximum likelihood techniques such as probit or conditional logit, or linear
probability model with random or fixed effects. For the reason that unobserved
heterogeneity is correlated with our firm specific controls, random effect
estimation is not appropriate for our specification. As a result, to model the
unobserved heterogeneity as fixed, we choose to work with linear probability
model.
11

In addition, it is highly likely that unobserved characteristics in our model
are serially correlated with

(

) . Therefore, we follow a methodology

similar to our earlier estimation to correct for autocorrelation and instrument for
(

) using its second lag. Given the potential correlation of FE transformed

residuals with the lagged export value, we also estimate our model using IV first
differences in order to avoid the problem of inconsistent estimates found in the
fixed effects model.

4. RESULTS
The results derived from estimating equation (3) are shown in the second
column of Table 2. As opposed to the first specification, the effect of AD duty is
significant when it is interacted with the past exporting status (type 3). This
suggests that firms begin to increase their shipments to alternative countries that
they were already exporting the same product when they suffer an AD duty in a
particular export destination (intensive margin). In terms of the economic
interpretation, imposition of a trade restriction in the form of an AD duty on a sixdigit HS product results in a 13% increase in the Brazilian firms’ exports of the
targeted product to alternative countries where the firms previously exported the
same product.20
The third column of Table 2 documents the results for the extensive margin
estimation. Similarly, the past exporting statuses of the firms are interacted with
the policy variable. As shown, although the interaction of AD duty variable is
significant for type 2, the policy variable itself and the type 1 interaction term is
insignificant. This suggests that imposition of an AD duty in a particular
destination increases the firms’ probability of exporting the targeted product in a
different destination if the firm already served the market before. On the contrary,
we do not observe such a probability increase to the export destinations that firms
To better quantify the magnitude of trade deflection, we use the formula in Kennedy (1981) to
convert the coefficient of the dummy variable to its true marginal effect.
20
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did not export before. In terms of the magnitude of the effect, imposition of an AD
duty in a particular destination increases the probability of exporting in a different
destination by 11 for the destinations that the firm exported another product
before.
In conclusion to the extensive margin estimation, the insignificant
coefficient of type 1 interaction demonstrate that market specific start-up costs of
exporting plays a crucial role in determining the potential export market to deflect
trade for the firms whose product suffer an AD duty in a particular destination.
This might also be related to the temporary feature of the AD duties. It would be
plausible for a targeted firm to deflect its trade to a country they never exported
before as a result of a permanent change in a particular country’s trade policy.
However, the cost of the temporary adjustment in trade policy in the form of an
AD duty in an export market does not seem enough to dominate the market
specific start-up costs in another destination; although it seems to offset the
market-product specific start-up costs.
5. CONCLUSION
Trade deflection has become an important issue in the WTO and other
Customs Unions’ framework. From China specific safeguards to intra-regional
trade protocols, there are many examples of policy debates regarding this issue. 21
This paper represents the first attempt to utilize a rich four dimensional customs
data of firms, products and export destinations to analyze the effect of past
exporting relationships on trade deflection resulting from AD duties which targets
Brazilian exported products. Our key finding is that firms only deflect exports to
countries where they have an already established trading relationship. In
particular, we find that, on the intensive margin, firms increase their export by to
alternative countries in which they were already exporting the targeted product
when they suffer an AD duty in a particular export destination. On the extensive
WTO section 16.8 allows a WTO member to impose a “China safeguard” on a product imported
from China if the same product has already been targeted by another WTO member.
21

13

margin, our findings suggest that firms’ probability of exporting the duty imposed
product to a different market increases only if they have already an established
trading relationship in that market. In contrast, we find no significant effect of AD
duties on the firms’ probability of exporting the particular product in different
export destinations that the firm did not export before. In addition to making
sense of existing puzzles in trade deflection, this paper makes an important
contribution by demonstrating how much the fixed costs of developing an
export destination matter in terms of trade deflection.
Our paper also paves the way for a more detailed exploration of trade
deflection using the firm level data in order to better understand the trading
effects of AD policy not only for the duty imposer and the targeted country but
also for the third party countries which are not named in the investigation. In
addition, we also point out a new view to examine the relationship between trade
deflection and the spread of worldwide AD filings. We believe that researchers
and policy makers should focus more on exporting firms’ past trading
relationships when evaluating the threat of trade deflection in the World trading
system. For instance, Feinberg and Reynolds (2006, 2007) and Moore and Zanardi
(2008) speculate that the spread of AD filings may partially be explained by trade
deflection.22 As noted earlier, when exports are deflected to third party countries,
these third countries might also subsequently request more import protection in
the form of AD duties. To capture this possible explanation, they use a variable
which is equal to the number of global AD cases filed the previous year in the
particular industry category. Although their estimates are significant, this variable
does not capture the true effect of trade deflection due to the aggregation. It is not
typical for a country to impose a restriction on a product because of a surge in
imports in another product within the same industry. Second, this measure does
not provide any clue about the destinations that exports should deflect to. For
We should note that the effect of trade deflection on the spread of AD filings is not the actual
research question, whereas, it is a control variable in both papers.
22
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instance, a high number of AD duties imposed on steel products in North America
against Mexico does not guarantee either trade deflection for all Mexican firms or
trade deflection to all countries. As a matter of fact, it is less likely to observe a
reaction from a country, which has a small import share of steel from North
America, to a steel war in the region.
Our study also raises concerns to the WTO’s China safeguard which allows
members to deviate from MFN rule based on the threat of trade deflection. As
more disaggregated firm-level data of exports become available, we believe that
researchers should focus on the trading relationships of firms in different
countries when they evaluate the threat of trade deflection and its effect on the rise
of protectionist policies.
Another related question regarding our paper is whether the targeted firms
switch exported products in the duty imposer country when they deflect their
trade to different destinations or whether the imposition of an AD duty in a
country affects the firms’ exports of another product, rather than the targeted one,
because of trade deflection. While our focus in this paper is the effect of past
trading relationships on trade deflection, analyzing the trading effects of AD in
terms of these related topics is an attractive avenue for future research.
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TABLE 1: ANTIDUMPING DUTIES IMPOSED ON BRAZILIAN EXPORTERS
1994-2000
Case

Imposing country

Product

Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

USA
USA
USA
USA
Australia
Australia
Canada
European Union
India
Mexico
European Union
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
USA
Mexico
Peru
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
South Africa
Argentina
Argentina
European Union
South Africa
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
South Africa
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Canada
Canada
Turkey
European Union

Stainless Steel Wire Rod
Ferrosilicon
Silicomanganese
Stainless Steel Bar
A4 Cut Ream Copy Paper
Fibreglass Gun Rovings
Corrosion Resistant Steel Sheet
Pig Iron (Hematite)
Bisphenol-A
Specialty Steel Products
Ferro-Silico Manganese
Hot-Rolled Steel
Steel Sheets
Cold-Rolled Steel
Steel Plates In Rolls
Corrugated Iron Sheets
Butyl Rubber
Pressure Pipe
Steel Connectors
Calcium Carbide
Chain Saws
Ceramic Magnets
Fuses
Suspension PVC
Gas Carafe
Fiber Optic Cables
Monosodium Glutamate
Uncoated wood-free paper
Chains
Abrasives
Flat Laminated Products
Cut paper (A4)
Eviscerated Chicken
Javelins
Denim
Steel Sheets
Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate
Stainless Steel Round Bar
Fittings
Malleable Cast Iron Pipe Fittings

1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995

Source: Bown (2010)

1995
1996
1997
1997
1997
1997
1997
1998
1998
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000

Table 2. Example of data
Firm

Product

Destination Year

AD
Type Type Type
dummy 1
2
3

101

Steel connectors
(HS6:730719)
Steel connectors
(HS6:730719
Steel connectors
(HS6:730719)
Ferro-silico-manganese
(HS6:720230)
Ferro-silico-manganese
(HS6:720230)

Argentina

1996

1

1

0

0

Chile

1996

1

0

1

0

USA

1996

1

0

0

1

Canada

1996

0

0

0

1

Chile

1996

0

0

0

1

101
101
101
101

Table 3. Estimation Results
Intensive Margin
IV first dif.
AD duty

(1)
0.073
(0.26)

(2)
0.062
(0.86)

AD duty*type1
AD duty*type2
AD duty*type3

0.132
(8.32)***

Type1
Type2

Extensive Margin
IV first dif.
(3)
0.014
(0.63)
0.054
(0.77)
0.113
(12.38)***
-0.013
(1.01)
0.156
(1.67)*

Type3
0.154
(19.22)***
0.089
(15.76)***

0.192
(10.53)***
0.166
(18.43)***
0.082
(22.67)***

0.069
(10.14)***

Country-year dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

R2

0.17

0.21

0.18

Observations

18657

18657

173040

ln(expfpit-1)
ln(empft)

Notes: Subscript f is a firm, p is a 6-digit HS product, i is an export market, t is a year.
Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote variables statistically
significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. All specifications include a constant term
which is suppressed.

Table A1. SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable

Mean

Standard
deviation

∆ln(expfpit)φ

6.534

3.869

18657

EXPfpit

0.312

0.967

173040

(ADduty)fpht

0.416

0.553

173040

(ADduty)fpht* Type1

0.182

0.370

173040

(ADduty)fpht * Type2

0.109

0.267

173040

(ADduty)fpht * Type3

0.125

0.289

173040

∆ln(employment)ft

-0.031

0.654

173040

Observations

Notes: Global Antidumping Database, SECEX and RAIS. Notes: Subscript f is a firm, p is a 6-digit HS product, i is
an export market,t is a year. φ denotes the summary statistics only for the unit observations with positive
export values.

